US v Ah Sing 1917

G.R. No. L-13005        October 10, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.

Antonio Sanz for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:


Facts of the Case:

          Ah Sing is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign steamer which arrive at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917 after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The authorities upon making a search found the eight cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

Issue: Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been proven?

Held:

              Yes. The crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been proven. Section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation.

Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands.

Pp v Look Chaw 1910

G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

ARELLANO, C. J.:

Facts of the Case:

            On August 19, 1909, several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo. Look Chaw was found to be in possession of opium for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz. The said steamship came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu. The defendant prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to try for the same facts therein did not constitute a crime. The Court of First Instance ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction to try the said case.

Held:

       No. Mere possession of opium aboard a foreign merchant vessel in transit is not triable in Philippine courts and therefore cannot be tried under our jurisdiction. But when the tins of opium are landed from the vessel on Philippine soil, our courts acquire jurisdiction in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty. Therefore, imprisonment and fine were reduced from 5 years to six months and 10,000 to 1,000 respectively. All other aspects were affirmed with the cost of this instance against the appellant.

US v Bull 1910

G.R. No. L-5270             January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J.:

Facts of the Case: 

             Many months prior to the 2nd day of December, 1908, H.N. Bull, the master of a steam vessel known as the steamship Standard, willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit and by that reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.

Issue: Whether or not the case is triable within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines.

Held:

            Yes. 

Schneckenburger v. Moran 1936

G.R. No. L-44896             July 31, 1936

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.

Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Facts of the Case: 

The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.

       2. Whether or not the Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines and thus prevents the Court of First Instance from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed.

Held:

         1.  No. The Supreme Court find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States governs this case. The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned, the Constitution of the Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land and it provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.”

             2.  No. The Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." However, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act No. 136 (all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly), which reads as follows: The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.

Liang v Pp Digest 2001

G.R. No. 125865            March 26, 2001

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts of the Case: 

     A Chinese national Jeffrey Liang (Huefeng),  who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases.

       Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the statements allegedly made by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official functions.

Held: 

       No. The provisions of Section 45 (a) of the Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank only gives immunity to the officers and staff from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity. Slander or oral defamation cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.

Raquiza v Bradford Digest 1945

G.R. No. L-44            September 13, 1945

LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.

Guillermo B. Guevarra for petitioners.
J.A. Wolfson for respondents.

HILADO, J.:

Facts of the Case: 

       Petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante were arrested for charges of “Espionage activity for Japanese” and “Active collaboration with the enemy” by virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur on December 29, 1944.

           Petitioners pray that the Officers, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the CIC, U.S. Army, be directed to appear before the court and produce the bodies of petitioners, and to show cause why they should not forthwith be set at liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the foreign military has the legal power to detain the petitioners.

Held:

           Yes. The Commonwealth Government asked, and the United States Government agreed, that the United States Army come and be stationed in the Philippines, for the very realization of the overruling and vehement desire and dream of the Filipino to be freed from the shackles of Japanese tyranny. The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those punishments which the government of this army may require.

US v Sweet Digest 1901

G.R. No. 448           September 20, 1901

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.

Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

LADD, J.:

Facts of the Case:

             Philip K. Sweet was an employee of the United States military authorities in the Philippines. He assaulted a prisoner of war for which he was charged with the crime of physical injuries.

Issue: Whether or not the case can be prosecuted under our civil courts.

Held: 

                Yes. The case against Sweet can be prosecuted under our civil courts. The fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as an offense under the Spanish military legislation does not render them any less an offense under the article of the Penal Code punishable under civil courts. Moreover, the military character sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of its commission does not exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.

Pp v Diaz Conde Digest 1922

G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE, defendants-appellants.

Araneta & Zaragoza for appellants.

Attorney-General Villareal for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

Facts of the Case:

      On December 30, 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and Engracio Liaco borrowed from Vicente Diaz-Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde the sum of P300. They obligated themselves to pay the defendants 5% per month, payable within the first ten days beginning on January 1916.

On May 1, 1916, Act No. 2655 (Usury Law) took effect.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants violated Act No. 2655.

Held: 

             No. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That law must govern and control the contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect its validity, construction, or discharge.

In the present case, making Act No. 2655 applicable to the act complained of which had been done before the law was adopted, a criminal act, would give it an ex post facto operation.

              An ex post facto law, is a law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal. Ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.

            The decision of the lower court is revoked and the complaint dismissed.

Pp v Villaraza Digest 1978

G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan de Oro City), and CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.

Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr., Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City for petitioner.

Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar Puerto.

AQUINO, J.:

Facts of the Case: 

        On October 16, 1974, Caesar Puerto issued two bouncing checks for the total sum of P4,966.63.

            City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the accused had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. He directed that the case be elevated, for trial, to the Court of First Instance or the Circuit Criminal Court. His view is that the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance because estafa committed by the accused is punishable by prision mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

           Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII returned the case to the city court because in its opinion the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and, the city court, as the first court which took cognizance of the case, should try it.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the Presidential Decree No. 818 is applicable to the Puerto’s case.

           2.  Whether or not the case can be elevated for trial to the Court of First Instance.

Held: 

        1. No. The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten years, imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by means of issuing bouncing checks committed on or after October 22, 1975. That increased penalty does not apply to estafa committed on October 16, 1974 because it would make the decree an ex post facto law.

      2. No. City courts shall try parties charged with an offense, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. Since the case of estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is punishable under Article 325 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to prision correctional minimum or four months and one day to two years and four months, the case shall be returned to the city court.

In Re. Kay Villegas Kami, Inc. 1970

G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.

KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.

MAKASIAR, J.:.

Facts of the Case:

      Petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology. However, Under Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 states:

No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or allow himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization, and no political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization or organized group of whatever nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election…

             A petition for a declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention.

Issues: 1. Whether or not R.A. No. 6132 is an ex post facto law.

            2. Whether or not the R.A No. 6132 is constitutional.

Held:

         1. No. R.A. No. 6132 is not an ex post facto law. Though Section 18 of R.A. No. 6132, provides for a penalty clause, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto.

           2. Yes. It does not violate freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal protection clauses. It is designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the laws.

Pp v Ferrer Digest 1972

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (act), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.

Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.

Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.

CASTRO, J.:p

Facts of the Case:

             On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion.

Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, under the decision of Hon. Simeon Ferrer in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused.

The Government appealed.

Issue: Whether or not, REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law a bill of attainder.

Held:

            No. A bill of attainder is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt.

                In the instant case, if Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective. The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.