US v Ah Sing 1917

G.R. No. L-13005        October 10, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.

Antonio Sanz for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:


Facts of the Case:

          Ah Sing is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign steamer which arrive at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917 after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The authorities upon making a search found the eight cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

Issue: Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been proven?

Held:

              Yes. The crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been proven. Section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation.

Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands.

Pp v Look Chaw 1910

G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.

Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.

ARELLANO, C. J.:

Facts of the Case:

            On August 19, 1909, several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo. Look Chaw was found to be in possession of opium for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz. The said steamship came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu. The defendant prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to try for the same facts therein did not constitute a crime. The Court of First Instance ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction to try the said case.

Held:

       No. Mere possession of opium aboard a foreign merchant vessel in transit is not triable in Philippine courts and therefore cannot be tried under our jurisdiction. But when the tins of opium are landed from the vessel on Philippine soil, our courts acquire jurisdiction in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty. Therefore, imprisonment and fine were reduced from 5 years to six months and 10,000 to 1,000 respectively. All other aspects were affirmed with the cost of this instance against the appellant.

US v Bull 1910

G.R. No. L-5270             January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J.:

Facts of the Case: 

             Many months prior to the 2nd day of December, 1908, H.N. Bull, the master of a steam vessel known as the steamship Standard, willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit and by that reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.

Issue: Whether or not the case is triable within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines.

Held:

            Yes. 

Schneckenburger v. Moran 1936

G.R. No. L-44896             July 31, 1936

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.

Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Facts of the Case: 

The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.

       2. Whether or not the Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines and thus prevents the Court of First Instance from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed.

Held:

         1.  No. The Supreme Court find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States governs this case. The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned, the Constitution of the Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land and it provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.”

             2.  No. The Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." However, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act No. 136 (all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly), which reads as follows: The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.

Liang v Pp Digest 2001

G.R. No. 125865            March 26, 2001

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts of the Case: 

     A Chinese national Jeffrey Liang (Huefeng),  who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases.

       Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the statements allegedly made by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official functions.

Held: 

       No. The provisions of Section 45 (a) of the Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank only gives immunity to the officers and staff from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity. Slander or oral defamation cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.

Raquiza v Bradford Digest 1945

G.R. No. L-44            September 13, 1945

LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.

Guillermo B. Guevarra for petitioners.
J.A. Wolfson for respondents.

HILADO, J.:

Facts of the Case: 

       Petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante were arrested for charges of “Espionage activity for Japanese” and “Active collaboration with the enemy” by virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur on December 29, 1944.

           Petitioners pray that the Officers, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the CIC, U.S. Army, be directed to appear before the court and produce the bodies of petitioners, and to show cause why they should not forthwith be set at liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the foreign military has the legal power to detain the petitioners.

Held:

           Yes. The Commonwealth Government asked, and the United States Government agreed, that the United States Army come and be stationed in the Philippines, for the very realization of the overruling and vehement desire and dream of the Filipino to be freed from the shackles of Japanese tyranny. The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those punishments which the government of this army may require.

US v Sweet Digest 1901

G.R. No. 448           September 20, 1901

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.

Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

LADD, J.:

Facts of the Case:

             Philip K. Sweet was an employee of the United States military authorities in the Philippines. He assaulted a prisoner of war for which he was charged with the crime of physical injuries.

Issue: Whether or not the case can be prosecuted under our civil courts.

Held: 

                Yes. The case against Sweet can be prosecuted under our civil courts. The fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as an offense under the Spanish military legislation does not render them any less an offense under the article of the Penal Code punishable under civil courts. Moreover, the military character sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of its commission does not exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.